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Nationalpopulism, Right and Left: The Social-National 
Synthesis Today. 
Daniel Rueda, King’s College London 
For most of the postwar period the idea of merging socialist (or popular) and nationalist 
elements was marginal in Europe. But in the last two decades we have been witnessing a new 
form of social-national synthesis: nationalpopulism. This article examines this resurgence by 
comparing right-wing nationalpopulism and left-wing nationalpopulism. In order to do so, it 
focuses on four European countries: France, Italy, Greece and Spain. While there are both policy 
and discursive similarities between these two forms of nationalpopulism, this article argues that 
they are fundamentally different and belong to antagonistic ideological factions. Keywords: 
populism, nationalism, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Syriza, Podemos. 
 
Introduction 
‘Populism’ is undoubtedly one of today’s most disputed political terms. The 
proliferation of literature on the topic has led to a semantic inflation that threatens the 
possibility of reaching an operative definition. Its overuse in the mass media, as well as the 
fact that it is generally employed in an illocutionary, rather than descriptive, way only adds 
to the problem. Moreover, the different forms of populism are often mistaken for one another, 
causing a problematic assumption of homogeneity. 
This paper does not intend to contribute to the blossoming literature on generic 
populism. It will instead examine a variant of populism, nationalpopulism, in its two main 
forms, by focusing on the European context. Analyzing the differences between right-wing 
nationalpopulism (RWNP) and left-wing nationalpopulism (LWNP) requires a concrete 
framework, one that allows an understanding of these phenomena in depth instead of simply 
analyzing their surface features. In order to conduct such examination, this work will employ 
the theory of populism developed by the Essex School of Discourse Analysis (ESDA) in the 
last four decades. 
Populism will thus be understood as “a way of constructing the political” (Laclau 
2005), rather than as a political style (Moffitt 2016), a thin-centered ideology (Stanley 2008; 
Mudde 2014) or a political tactic (Weyland 2001). In order to examine the different faces of 
nationalpopulism, this work will thus go beyond ideational and functionalist approaches by 
engaging in a discourse analysis as understood by David Howarth (2013) and other members 
of the ESDA. Of course, the commitment to associate nationalism and left-wing, or social 
demands, is far from being a historical novelty. What is here referred to as the first social-
national synthesis took place between the end of the nineteenth century and the second half 
of the twentieth century, when both left-wing and right-wing forces sought either to use the 




power of nationalism for social purposes or to add social and popular elements to their 
nationalist projects (Sternhell 1994, 6). What we have been witnessing in the last two decades, 
in a context of neoliberal globalization, is the emergence of a second social-national synthesis 
in Europe, although this time in the form of an amalgamation of post-1945 nationalism with a 
non-revolutionary type of populism. 
Nationalpopulist discourses will be considered as contemporary phenomena, rather 
than as the return of any concrete political tendency. Yet referring to past attempts to creating 
a social-national or popular-national synthesis can be valuable. This paper will regard them 
as proof of a recurrent practice within modern societies that now takes new historical forms. 
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès or Enrico Corradini therefore play the same role here that Joseph de 
Maistre could have in an essay on fascism or François-Noël Babeuf in an account of 
communism, that is, not as part of the object of study but as historical precedents that can help 
us to understand it. 
Both RWNP and LWNP are here considered forms of nationalism. It is certainly not 
the first time that nationalism emerges as a product of the hybridization between national 
consciousness and a concrete political tendency (Álvarez Junco 2017). After all, nationalism 
has been combined with ideals of liberty against absolute monarchs both in America and 
Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the democratic struggles 
during the 1848 revolutions, with reactionary and imperialist goals between the nineteenth 
century and the fascist era, with socialism in the USSR under Stalin’s regime, as well as in 
Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China, with anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa, and with 
religious affiliations in countries like Iran and Israel. This is why Anthony D. Smith describes 
nationalism as a movement “with chameleon-like adaptability” (Smith 1998, 44). 
This paper is divided in two sections following the section on methodological 
clarifications. The first explores RWNP by analyzing a series of contemporary political 
discourses. It will mainly focus on two European countries that have been witness to the rise 
of right-wing populist parties in the last decade: Italy and France. The second part examines 
LWNP by focusing on two European nations which are at the origin of the two most successful 
left-wing populist parties of the continent: Spain and Greece. This case selection allows for an 
exploration of the differences between the two forms of European nationalpopulism in 
heterogeneous contexts. 
Methodology: the Essex School of Discourse Analysis 
This article employs the theory of populism formulated by the Essex School of 
Discourse Analysis since the eighties as its framework. Its key constituents are Ernesto Laclau 
(the author of On Populist Reason), Chantal Mouffe (co-author of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy), David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, Yannis Stavrakakis (editors of Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change) and Jason Glynos (co-author of Logics 
of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory). 
Their framework questions the division between linguistic and extralinguistic realities by 
formulating a notion of ‘discourse’ influenced both by post-structuralist authors such as 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and by linguistic pragmatists such as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105-108). It starts from the premise 
that “every object is constituted as an object of discourse,” which in no case implies 
questioning the existence of social or material reality (108-110). It is thus a rejection of 
epistemological formalism that emphasizes the importance of political and social aspects of 




the production of knowledge. 
Using this theoretical frame, Ernesto Laclau analyzed the way collective political 
identities are formed in his seminal work On Populist Reason (2005). He did so through an 
examination of populism, a way of constructing the political that he, as an Argentinean who 
witnessed the rise and fall of Peronism, knew well. According to Laclau, the unit of analysis 
when scrutinizing political groups should not be the class or the individual, but rather the 
different demands which, once articulated, compose a collective identity (Laclau 2005, IX). 
The process of articulation is defined as ‘‘any practice establishing a relationship among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985, 105). Laclau designates two types of demands: democratic and popular. 
Democratic demands are those which remain isolated, while popular demands are those 
which are part of a populist formation (Laclau 2005, 74). 
The result of the articulatory practices is the emergence of a discursive formation 
(Laclau 2005, 87). Here, Laclau refers to the populist movement or party (but more broadly to 
any political identity) by using a linguistic metaphor, following David Howarth’s definition 
of discourses as “concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically 
political, as their formation is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between insiders and outsiders” (Howarth 
2000, 9). The content of any particular element (for example, a demand, a word, a stance…) 
depends on the discursive formation in which it is inscribed. In other words, the signifiers 
‘our nation’ or ‘the people’ can only be understood as parts of the political structure they are 
part of. This approach avoids the misconception that right-wing and left-wing populist 
movements must be similar since their discourses sometimes semantically overlap. 
The construction of equivalential links between the demands, essential for the 
cohesion of the movement, depends on the production of empty signifiers. This is a concept 
borrowed from Jacques Lacan’s work. Laclau (2005) defines the empty signifier as “a 
particularity embodying an unachievable fullness” (71). In this context, ‘signifier’ is 
understood in its widest sense. It can be a symbol, such as a word, a flag, an icon, or a leader, 
and in any case it will have to be the product of a “radical investment,” which means that 
there will be an important affective relation between ‘the people’ and that empty signifier (97). 
The operation whereby a particularity takes an “incommensurable universal 
connotation” is what Laclau calls ‘hegemony’ (70), an important term with several meanings 
in the history of Marxist thought (Anderson 2017). Therefore, “in a hegemonic relation, one 
particular difference [for example, a national symbol] assumes the representation of a totality 
that exceeds it,” which leads us to the notion of synecdoche, a rhetorical device whereby the 
part of something represents its totality. According to Laclau (2005), the synecdoche “is not 
simply one more rhetorical device, simply to be taxonomically added to other figures such as 
metaphor and metonymy, but has a different ontological function” (72). In populist 
movements ‘the people’, although it logically cannot represent the totality of the population, 
presents itself as the populus, that is, as the entirety of the polity. 
According to this approach, populism will thus be defined as a political movement 
that: 1) articulates heterogeneous unsatisfied demands, thereby creating an original discursive 
formation and a new ‘collective will’; 2) is based on the construction of equivalential links and 
dichotomic frontiers as well as on the universalistic pretension of representing the totality of 
the populus; and, 3) has an antagonistic and metapolitical approach, inasmuch as it seeks to 




question and transform the political landscape, both in terms of who is the hegemon and how 
the political map looks like. 
           Thus, we shall define nationalpopulism as a type of populist movement in which the 
nation acts as the key empty signifier, and in which hegemony is achieved thanks to a 
nationalist stance which serves as a bonding agent for several, heterogeneous demands. 
Nationalpopulism stems from a fusion of popular and national elements and sees the ‘national 
people’ as the main political actor, a collective identity threatened by its generally foreign 
antagonists and linked thanks to national symbols and common historical traits. 
Inasmuch as nationalpopulism promotes “a sentiment or consciousness of belonging 
to the nation” and it can be considered as “a social and political movement on behalf of the 
nation,” it can be defined as a form of nationalism according to Anthony D. Smith’s classical 
characterization (Smith 2001, 5). It also fits Alberto Martinelli’s definition of nationalism as an 
ideology that “fosters specific collective movements and policies promoting the sovereignty, 
unity, and autonomy of the people gathered in a single territory” (Martinelli 2018, 14). 
Right-wing Nationalpopulism: the Plebeian Nation 
This section seeks to dispel the myth that right-wing nationalism has always been 
either related to socially conservative stances, or simply indifferent to any kind of social 
policy. This perception is probably linked to the idea that nationalism is an ‘outward-looking’ 
ideology concerned with international affairs rather than with public policies, but also to a 
general lack of knowledge about the several historical attempts by right-wing nationalist 
movements to integrate social, economically illiberal concerns. 
The most important examples of this social-national synthesis can be found in France, 
Germany, and Italy during the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In 1898 Maurice Barrès, a French novelist and politician, coined the term ‘national-
socialism’ and called to fight against an alleged political alliance between the Jewish people, 
bankers, leftists, Germans, liberals, and cosmopolitans of any kind. Barrès was a fierce 
supporter of Boulangism, a movement with both nationalist, revolutionary, populist and 
Jacobin roots (Sternhell 1973, 1). A decade later, Oswald Spengler—one of the main exponents 
of the Konservative Revolution—published “Prussianism and Socialism,” in which he offered 
his idea of socialism as “a way of life” inseparable from authoritarianism, communitarianism, 
and nationalism (Spengler 1908, 32). Around the same time, one of the most influential 
thinkers of Nazism, although not a Nazi himself, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, defended his 
idea of a “German socialism” based on social corporatism and revolutionary conservatism 
(O’Sullivan 1983, 144-147). 
In terms of political praxis, Charles Maurras, the leader of radical right party Action 
Française, was one of the most ardent proponents of “embracing socialism after extricating it 
from its cosmopolitan and democratic elements” (Sternhell 1994, 119). In Germany, a worker-
based branch of Nazism called Strasserism, along with the hybrid movement of the National-
Bolsheviks created by the former socialist militant Ernst Niekisch were the most prominent  
expressions of the national-social blend during the interwar period. 
But the climax of the social-national synthesis took place in Italy during and after the 
Great War (1914-1918). As Massulli (2014) explains, the Italian revolutionary syndicalists had 
an enormous influence in the advent of fascism. Both nationalists (such as Gabriele 
d’Annunzio and Enrico Corradini) and former socialists (such as Michele Bianchi and Benito 
Mussolini) understood the necessity of somehow associating both worldviews. The Italian 




socialist Arturo Labriola argued in 1910 that there were two types of nationalism: the 
nationalism of the workers—popular and equalitarian—and the nationalism of the elites— 
dishonest and imperialist (Sternhell 1994, 250). In the aftermath of the war the fasci di 
combattimento and Associazione Nazionale Italiana, the embryos of the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista (1921), were the main proponents of this form of national socialism whereby the ethnos 
is a plebeian political subject opposed to unpatriotic elites. 
Apart from Alceste de Ambris, the majority of Italian revolutionary syndicalists 
(Agostino Lanzillo, Angelo Olivetti, Sergio Panunzio, Alfredo Rocco among others) reached 
important positions within the fascist regime by promoting a plebeian, social and 
revolutionary variety of nationalism that had also succeeded on the other side of the Alps, 
although by taking a different form. The core idea running through this ideological 
articulation can be summed up by Ramiro Ledesma’s famous statement (today surprisingly 
parroted by the Spanish far-right party Vox): “Only the rich can permit themselves the luxury 
of not having a homeland” (Jones 2019). There are thus two key elements: the articulation of 
the social and the national and the idea that the motherland is a protection against anti-social 
and alien disruptive forces. 
This historical period, from the late nineteenth century to 1945, ‘the first social-national 
synthesis’ ended up calamitously with the defeat of the Axis in 1945. It is not until the last 
decade (with the exception of the surprisingly popular Movimento Sociale Italiano) that we 
can find a serious attempt to articulate social and nationalist stances from the right in Europe. 
Instead of a corporatist, revolutionary nationalist, or national-syndicalist force, it has emerged 
as right-wing national populism (RWNP). 
Here again it is necessary to start in France. In 2012 the Front National (rebranded as 
Rassemblement National in 2018) became a party that rejected the left-right classification and 
promoted a distinction between ‘the people’ (sometimes referred to as “the forgotten” who 
“suffer in silence”) and ‘the elites’ (both French, European and global). Both elements were 
part of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s discourse as well, especially during his last years as president of 
the party when he flirted with populist strategies, but the difference is that in his case those 
were rhetorical devices that didn’t represent the ethos of his Front National (Eltchaninoff 
2017). In Marine Le Pen’s genuine populist project, however, the commitment to build a 
dichotomic frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites,’ and the preference for an ambiguous 
discourse that ventures into traditionally liberal and leftist semantic domains, is of paramount 
importance. This nationalpopulist stance, which includes many social elements, was mainly 
envisioned by Florian Philippot, her former right-hand man (Fernández-Vázquez 2019). 
Marine Le Pen often engages in RWNP discourses, and she does so in two ways. First, 
she and her populist party seek to articulate a plurality of democratic demands that are social, 
territorial, and cultural, and which are then presented as national problems from which the 
‘French people’ is suffering. Second, the now popular demands are often deemed to be 
solvable only by confronting an international, rather than national, antagonist. This 
international antagonist has many faces—immigrants, Muslims, ‘global elites,’ European 
bureaucrats and its French allies—but because populist discourses not only create 
equivalences between demands but also between their opponents (that is, ‘the people’ and the 
‘elite’ are both the product of discursive bricolage), the antagonist appears as an alliance 
between different groups with shared interests. The idea at the heart of RWNP discourses is 
that the nation and its people, who are here one and the same, are oppressed by non-national 




actors. Marine Le Pen provided good evidence of this when she accused the then French 
president François Hollande of being “the vice-chancellor of the province of France for 
Germany” and imposing austerity measures that only benefit Berlin (Bogani 2015). 
Italy, probably the most important nation when it comes to social-national syntheses, 
has also witnessed the emergence of RWNP stances. In reality, the social-national position did 
not abruptly end in Italy in 1945, for it was to some extent defended by the neo-fascist 
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) until decades after. But Matteo Salvini’s Lega is far from 
being a fascist movement, unlike the MSI or CasaPound, which are contemporary genuine 
examples of such current (Gentile 2019). After all, it is clear that this former Padanian 
secessionist, who has shifted his party from regionalism to Italian nationalism (and from 4% 
to more than 34% of the vote), has espoused stances that are closer to Marine Le Pen than to 
Giorgio Almirante. 
Although at the moment Salvini seems to have opted for an alliance with other right-
wing forces (mainly Forza Italia and Fratelli d’Italia) due to the incentives derived from the 
architecture of the electoral system of his country, between June 2018 and September 2019 he 
was Minister of the Interior in a coalition government with the Movimento 5 Stelle. It was 
during that period that he adopted a RWNP discourse. In December 2018 he claimed that he 
preferred “a government trusted by the people rather than one trusted by the international 
markets” (Il Fato 2018). The problem of Europe, according to him, is that it is ruled “by the 
finance oligarchy and those who permit mass immigration” (L’US 2019). After the European 
Union rejected the 2018 Italian budget, which sought to introduce a universal basic income 
and lower the retirement age, the so-called “people’s budget,” he urged EU leaders to “respect 
the Italian people” (France24 2018). In October 2019, shortly after the end of the coalition 
government, Salvini said he represented “the people against the elite, the squares against the 
palaces” (popolo contro elite, piazza contro Palazzo) (ReggioSera, 2019). 
 Mirroring his ally Marine Le Pen, Salvini stated in 2018 that the power of banks, the 
EU, austerity, mass immigration and economic precariousness are part of the same ‘regime’: 
“the next elections [the European elections of 2019] are a referendum between the Europe of 
the elites, of banks, of precariousness, of immigration, of austerity and the Europe of the 
people and the workers” (Valenti 2018). Political elites, immigrants (and NGOs), banks, the 
Left, EU bureaucrats… all conspire against ‘the (national) people,’ victims who just want good 
jobs and a sovereign state that can protect them from the dangers of globalization. In a rally 
in Milan with Le Pen and other leaders of the Western European radical right, Salvini cried 
out against “this immigration which has submerged our nations, putting our people at risk” 
(CGTN 2019). 
Those who serve foreign elites are thus ‘traitors against the motherland,’ which is 
exactly what Salvini accused Giuseppe Conte of being, because according to him he used 
Italian money to rescue German and French banks (Salvini 2019). It is important to highlight 
that the problem does not consist in using taxpayer’s money to rescue a bank, but to do so to 
rescue a non-Italian bank. It is interesting to note that this nationalist momentum has prepared 
the ground for the emergence of LWNP forces as well, such as Patria e Constituzione or VOX 
Italia (created by the self-declared Marxist thinker Diego Fusaro). 
Salvini and Le Pen claim to confront both mass immigration, Islamism, and the 
economic and political elites. This is why the idea of RWNP as a discourse that focuses on the 
construction of vertical frontiers instead of horizontal, ‘people versus elites,’ held by 




Hameleers (2018, 6) and by Gilles Gressani (2019, 77) is a misconception. If anything, it could 
be said that it promotes a diagonal frontier, including both ‘the establishment’ and non-
nationals, who are somehow part of the same group of interest (this is why the conspiracy 
theory of le grand remplacement, formulated by Rénaud Camus, is so appealing for RWNP 
militants). The idea that there is an alliance between the economic and political elites and 
ethnic minorities might seem extravagant, but it is certainly not an innovative view in the 
history of the radical right (Hanebrink 2018; Baker 2006). 
Therefore, the basic idea is that ‘the people’ has been left behind and its social and 
cultural demands are not satisfied by a political system that would rather serve the interests 
of immigrants, Muslims, and foreign elites. This inevitably reminds us of nationalist or far-
right movements. Yet RWNP is different from these at least in two ways. First of all, it is not 
just a reactive and xenophobic movement, and contrary to other radical right forces, neither 
Rassemblement National nor La Lega are niche parties. As a populist movement, RWNP 
formulates “a certain historical horizon” (Laclau 2005, 116), that is, it presents a socio-political 
alternative and promises to bring a new state of things into existence. And secondly, it links 
popular discontent not only with an ‘unpatriotic elite’ (co-opted by foreign actors) but also 
with the need of reinforcing or at least defending the social assistance that was built during 
the trente glorieuses, thereby fueling the so-called Welfare chauvinism (Ennser-Jedenastik 
2017). 
RWNP is certainly popular and plebeian but, so to speak, in a völkisch way. It offers a 
vision of its country as an underdog in the international arena while including social concerns, 
which inevitably reminds us of Enrico Corradini’s idea of Italy being a “proletarian nation” 
both morally and materially (Corner 2012). It bases its vision on the idea that both 
international relations and the distribution of social resources are highly competitive, and that 
the nation and its people must be protected from such a hostile world. This had led politicians 
like Salvini or Le Pen to subscribe to realist positions, flirting both with China and Russia 
while at the same time acknowledging the economic importance of the EU (Lafont 2017). 
Today’s proponents of the right-wing social-national synthesis are inspired by 
economists such as Maurice Allais (a fierce critic of globalization and ‘the free-trade 
ideology’), Bruno Lemaire and Louis Alliot (who consider that sovereignty and social 
expenditure are interconnected), and Bernard Monot (who praises state intervention and 
seeks to find a third way between liberalism and anticapitalism). In Italy, Alberto Bagnai (who 
defines himself as a Eurosceptic post-Keynesian left-wing populist despite being La Lega’s 
main economist) claims that only the nation-state can guarantee social dignity to workers 
(Petti 2013). Bagnai declared himself nationalist, populist, and socialist (Bagnai, 2013). His 
colleague Claudio Borghi, who shares Bagnai’s hard Euroscepticism, associates monetary 
sovereignty with social well-being (Carli 2018). 
          All of them are critics of the current economic state of affairs and are clearly concerned 
with social welfare. They oppose neoliberal arrangements and the ‘end of politics’, two key 
factors of the emergence of populist forces, as Chantal Mouffe noted (Mouffe 2004, 48). Yet 
their anti-globalization stance must be nuanced: as was the case with interwar fascists 
(Paxton,2004, 10), their rhetoric against the markets, the finance and international treaties is 
always selective. RWNP forces do not pretend to replace the current economic system, but 
rather to reinforce the possibilities of their nations to compete in it. In a highly competitive 
world, only by protecting their economies from immigration and globalization, they think, 




they can also protect ‘their people’. 
Left-wing Nationalpopulism: the Nationalization of the People 
The idea of associating social and nationalist elements as a leftist strategy was much 
less popular than the opposite during the first social-national synthesis. It can be considered 
as a punctual and calculated strategy rather than as a genuine and enduring political 
articulation. For example, in the context of the rise of fascism in Germany the KPD understood 
during a brief period of time the utility of being at the forefront of the national opposition 
against the “imperialist Versailles Treaty” (Moreau, 2018, 161). Leon Trotsky, referring to the 
same country in 1930, encouraged the German proletariat to strategically “put itself at the 
head of the nation as its leader” (Beetham, 2019, 205). 
Yet there are historical examples of left-wing social-national syntheses, especially at 
the beginning of the 20th century, a period marked by a profound crisis of Marxism and the 
resulting frustration of some socialist militants (Sternhell 1994, 15). The French philosopher 
Georges Sorel, author of Réflexions sur la violence (published in 1908), paved the way for the 
idea that the Left had to find new mobilizing myths instead of focusing on rationalist and 
economist discourses. The already mentioned Italian revolutionary syndicalists, deeply 
influenced by Sorel, saw in national consciousness and war mobilization the opportunity to 
appropriate powerful myths and symbols. “The motherland shouldn’t be rejected, but seized” 
(La patria non se contesta, ma se conquista), were the famous words of Edmondo Rossoni, leader 
of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro in 1918, a sentence later repeated by a still socialist Benito 
Mussolini. 
But the post-colonial world was and remains certainly a much more appropriate 
context for this type of social nationalism. In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the national-
building process took place at the same time as the anti-colonial struggle. It was also impacted 
by Marxism and by Soviet support, both before and after the Second World War (Young 2001, 
161-167). Ernesto Laclau himself took an active part in a LWNP Argentinean party, the Partido 
Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional, during the sixties. Today, in the majority of Latin-
American countries (Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela are probably the best-known 
examples), it is possible to find left-wing political parties which advocate nationalist positions, 
both against their national adversaries and against Washington. The case of Europe is exactly 
the opposite, inasmuch as since the end of nineteenth century nationalism in this continent 
has conservative, authoritarian and xenophobic connotations (Hobsbawm 1990, 101-107). 
This is why the rise of the Greek party Syriza at the beginning of this decade was such 
a surprising phenomenon. Syriza was created in 2004 as a coalition of different radical left 
groups (with Synaspismos, a Eurocommunist organization, as its major member), but around 
2010 it shifted toward a populist strategy (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). The populist 
turn proved successful; Syriza climbed from 4% of the votes in 2009 to 16% in 2012 and 28% 
in 2015. Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the coalition since 2009, was inspired by the 2010-2012 
anti-austerity movement (the so-called Aganaktisménon- Politón, ‘movement of the outraged’) 
and by the several work-based mobilizations of the period, which included several general 
strikes. He then realized that there was a possibility to articulate a plurality of demands that 
neither PASOK (the socialist party, in government between 2009 and 2011) nor, of course, the 
conservatives could satisfy. Syriza never became a nationalpopulist party, nor can it be 
compared with Salvini’s Lega or Le Pen’s Rassemblement National. However, it did engage 
in LWNP discourses, although only in certain circumstances. It is significant that both during 




the first and the second Tsipras governments (2015-2019), Sryiza’s junior coalition partner was 
Independent Greeks, a Greek nationalist right-wing party. 
This unnatural alliance took place in a context in which austerity and economic crisis 
were associated by many Greeks with foreign interference. After all, the European Union, led 
by Germany, was perceived as the political actor behind the public spending cuts and the 
several tax increases. A wave of Euroscepticism swept through the country, to the point that 
in January 2014 Nigel Farage became highly popular among many anti-austerity Greeks 
(Smith 2014). Still, today Greece maintains a less favorable view of the EU (Pew Research 
Center, 2018) and of Germany (Pew Research Center, 2019). The narrative supported both by 
the German government and by some German media only worsened the situation (Kutter 
2014). Moreover, Greece was continuously discredited by the three main rating agencies 
(Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings), all of them American. 
This was obviously a favorable environment for Greek ultranationalism. The neo- 
fascist party Golden Dawn won 7% of the votes in 2015 and became the country’s third 
political force, whereas the Independent Greeks (Syriza’s partners) won almost the 5%. 
During the strikes and the anti-austerity marches, both European and German flags were 
burned on several occasions. However, Tsipras was always careful not to fall into the trap of 
xenophobic discourses, and Syriza’s relationship with nationalism from 2012 to 2015 is very 
different than that of its far-right partner. Analyzing it will provide us with valuable 
information to understand LWNP. 
First of all, it is important to analyze the role of nationalism and of national 
consciousness in shaping the political identity formed from the links between the different 
social demands. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014, 10) draw attention to how Tsipras and 
Syriza continuously employed the word ‘people’ in order to identify their supporters and 
create the idea of a homogenous and united group, ready to oppose ‘the establishment.’ Yet it 
is important to note that, at least since the January 2015 Greek legislative election, Tsipras 
started to refer to ‘the people’ as ‘the Greek people,’ ‘our people,’ and ‘our country’. The 
nation, and not the leader or the signifier ‘people,’ became the empty signifier of Syriza’s 
discursive formation. But here the nation is not an ethnic entity, but a popular one. Because 
both RWNP and LWNP discourses employ the signifier ‘the people’ we can be lead to 
confusion, but in Syriza’s case it is clear that he refers to the people as plebs (as a subaltern, 
popular group) and not as ethnos (an ethnic or racial group). Therefore, instead of the nation 
being ‘popularized,’ the people, meaning here the economically subaltern, are ‘nationalized.’ 
And so here the nation and the plebs are one.  
This ephemeral nationalist turn was probably inevitable, since the Greek 
government’s main adversaries were at that moment international, or foreign, actors. A few 
days after Syriza’s victory, Tsipras and other members of his government paid homage to the 
Greek communists who fought against the Nazis during the war. In a moment of increased 
tensions with Angela Merkel’s government, Panos Skourletis, spokesman of Syriza, declared 
that the symbolic act “represents national resistance to occupation, but also the natural desire 
of Greeks for freedom, for liberty from German occupation” (Smith 2015). It is therefore hardly 
surprising that the Syntagma Square was filled with national flags during the June 25, 2015 
referendum, when Greek voters rejected austerity proposals from the country’s creditors. 
Secondly, during this brief period from 2014-2015 the antagonist was no longer the 
national elite or establishment, but foreign powers. Certainly both PASOK and New 




Democracy, the two main parties prior to Syriza’s dramatic ascendancy, were denounced as 
the culprits of the malaise of the people, but the Greek elite were now presented as allies of 
European and German actors. Yanis Varoufakis, the Minister of Finance from January to July 
2015, claimed in August of that same year that “the European leaders” act collusively with 
“Greek oligarchs” in order to allow them “to maintain their stranglehold on Greek society 
while punishing ordinary people” (Inman 2015). The tension between Varoufakis and the 
German government only increased when 2013 footage of him saying that Greece “should 
simply default on its debts and stick the finger to Germany” became viral (The Economist, 
2015). 
Syriza undoubtedly embraced a nationalist discourse that emphasized national-
popular resistance against foreign, and powerful, enemies, with a focus on Germany and, to 
a lesser extent, the European Union. The movement had no problems with making 
problematic historical analogies. Is there really any difference with Salvini’s or Le Pen’s 
approach? In fact, and despite what some media commentators may think, there are at least 
three. First of all, Syriza’s LWNP discourses were always internationalist, or at least 
regionalist. Tsipras and Varoufakis always underlined that their struggle was a European one, 
inasmuch as they genuinely intended to “free Europe” from austerity (Konstantinidis 2015). 
Secondly, Syriza, understanding the importance of the European project beyond its economic 
aspects, was always reluctant to fall into hard Euroscepticism. Its critique of the EU was 
always self-limited and hardly survived the year 2015. Finally, and this might be the key 
difference between European and Latin-American LWNP, Syriza’s nationalist stance was only 
situational and, contrary to RWNP forces, it was never part of the party’s discursive essence. 
Instead of being the product of the union of different pre-existing left-wing parties, the 
Spanish party Podemos was created in 2014 as a self-conscious populist force opposed both 
to the socialists and to the far left. Pablo Iglesias’ party abandoned to some extent its populist 
strategy during the year 2016, when the Spanish political system began to rearticulate and he 
decided to form an alliance with the far-left party Izquierda Unida, thereby changing its name 
to Unidas Podemos (United We Can). Prior to that, Podemos was a very particular example 
of populism, for it consciously operated by using Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s works 
as its strategic guideline (Errejón and Mouffe 2015, 7; Alcántara 2015), so much so that it could 
be described as a ‘Laclauian party’. The main founders of Podemos, including Iglesias, also 
drew inspiration from several Latin-American nationalpopulist movements. This prepared 
the ground for a political force eager to articulate all kind of heterogeneous demands and very 
calculating when it came to language and discourse. Its capacity to transcend the discursive 
milieu from which it comes from (the Spanish Left) is probably only comparable to Marine Le 
Pen’s. 
Podemos’ LWNP momentum overlapped with that of Syriza (2014-2015) with the 
creation of the party in January 2014, although as we shall see, some nationalpopulist elements 
persist today within the party and surface from time to time. Pablo Iglesias and Alexis Tsipras 
were close allies during this period. Iglesias travelled to Athens the day before the Greek 
legislative election and claimed that “the Greeks won’t bow the knee before Germany, they 
don’t want to go back to the past [a reference to the Nazi occupation of Greece], they know 
Tsipras is a lion (sic) that will defend its people despite everything” (Velasco 2015). A few 
months before, he stated that Greece deserved “to have a patriotic president who can protect 
the interests of the people” (Gil 2015). After Syriza’s victory, he basically paraphrased Marine 
Le Pen’s abovementioned remark on François Hollande being Merkel’s vice chancellor by 




saying he was happy that Greece “will have a Greek president and not a representative of 
Merkel” (Carvajal 2015). 
Iglesias, always willing to flirt with positions unfamiliar to the Spanish left, went as 
far as to declare that he didn’t want Spain to be “the country that serves beers and tapas to rich 
people from northern Europe” and that “it is clear that Angela Merkel wants us to be a colony” 
(Berlunes 2014). This eagerness to engage in LWNP discourses cannot but seem strange in a 
European context and it is probably due to the enormous influence that some Latin-American 
political experiences exerted on Podemos. 
But Brussels is not Washington, and Spain is not Argentina or Venezuela. Even if Spain 
is, along with Greece, the only European country in which people on the ideological left are 
more likely to give the EU negative marks (Pew Research Center 2018), Podemos hasn’t been 
able to successfully articulate a nationalpopulist discourse, among other things because, like 
Syriza, it has been reluctant to fall into Euroscepticism. Not to mention the fact that for 
historical reasons in Spain the national symbols are associated to the Right. This is actually far 
from being anomalous: it is also the case, for example, in countries such as Japan and England, 
whose national symbols have problematic connotations. In fact, the whole approach seemed 
somewhat artificial and, to some extent, the result of the lack of alternatives. For as Errejón 
himself declared: “there are only three great political aggregators in modernity: religion, class 
and nation” and only the third is available today (Neyra 2017). 
Be that as it may, Podemos’ nationalpopulist discourse is a good example of the two 
traits that have been here identified as the core of LWNP—the merging of the plebs and the 
nation and the construction of a dichotomic frontier against foreign powers. The first is an 
attempt to ‘nationalize the people,’ which consists of associating popular demands with a 
defense of the nation. In February 2015, Iglesias said that “the fatherland is having a good 
public healthcare system, the fatherland is having the possibility of sending your son to a good 
school, the fatherland is having a good economy so you don’t have to emigrate” (Jiménez 
2015). His then right-hand man, Iñigo Errejón, accused the Spanish socialists of being “false 
patriots” when they organized a rally with an enormous national flag: “you are traitors, 
because you gave Spain’s sovereignty to Merkel…if you really want to be patriots, that has 
nothing to do with flags, it has to do with defending the hospitals, the schools, the workers” 
(Aroca 2015). This very calculated nationalpopulist approach began to fade after 2016 
(although Iñigo Errejón tried to refloat it recently with his new party, Más País), but LWNP 
stances are still present in Podemos, especially since it has now to face a far-right adversary, 
Vox. 
The second key characteristic of LWNP discourse, the shift from a national to an 
international dichotomic frontier, was only possible during the height of the Greek 
government-debt crisis (2014-2016), when Syriza opposed Germany and the European Union 
even though Greece ultimately accepted their conditions. Thus, Podemos’ nationalist attitude 
(which went further than Syriza’s) necessarily overlapped with that of its Greek ally. After 
that brief moment of European division and apparent north/south confrontation, the 
‘nationalpopulist moment’ was over for left-wing European parties. Their right-wing 
counterparts did not have to face that issue because the type of nationalpopulism that they 
formulated did not depend on economic crisis or regional clashes. European LWNP, on the 
other hand, remains a rare and occasional type of political stance. It was probably only 
possible in a very particular context in which a huge economic crisis coexisted with austerity 




measures, economic international interference, and Angela Merkel playing the role of an 
arrogant northern ruler against southern subaltern countries. 
In order to draw a parallel between today’s national-social synthesis and the several 
experiments carried out by right-wing nationalist forces, we mentioned political figures such 
as Enrico Corradini and Charles Maurras. This section will end with the words of Emmanuel- 
Joseph Sieyès, whose 1789 reflections on the people and the nation fit with such accuracy with 
this section that it is impossible not to quote him. The abbé unwittingly describes two staples 
of LWNP as it has been analyzed here: its consideration that only the plebs is part of the nation 
and its aspirations to represent the totality of it. 
The nobility, however, is also a foreigner in our midst because of its civil and 
political prerogatives. (…) The Third Estate then contains everything that 
pertains to the nation while nobody outside the Third Estate can be considered 
as part of the nation. What is the Third Estate? Everything. 
 
Conclusions 
RWNP can be defined as a sort of plebeian nationalism, while LWNP is a form of 
nationalization of the people. In the first, the nation is victimized, and the ethnos is 
popularized. In the second, there is an isomorphism between the plebs and the nation. Whereas 
RWNP is one of the contemporary forms that the radical right can take, European LWNP is a 
punctual strategy embraced by political forces that are part of the democratic socialist and 
post-communist sphere. Podemos and Syriza were eager to criticize the EU and the German 
government at a certain point, but they were reluctant to support Eurosceptic postulates. On 
the other hand, both Rassemblement National and La Lega have Euroscepticism as one of 
their main ideological traits. 
In Europe, RWNP is less an anomaly than LWNP, a political stance more common in 
the third world, especially in Latin America, for historical reasons. While the synthesis 
between nationalism and popular or social positions has been historically successful in Europe 
when it was carried by right-wing movements, the opposite is generally not the case. 
However, the example of Greece and Spain during the Eurozone debt crisis shows that the 
possibility of articulating a LWNP discourse exists in our continent. 
The points of departure of RWNP and LWNP are thus different, and so are their 
intentions and their ideological forebears. It is important, both for political scientists and for 
citizens, to be able to distinguish between these two tendencies. We are already witnessing 
the spread of the misleading idea that left-wing and right-wing populism are pretty similar 
phenomena. Insofar as nationalpopulist forces employ a similar vocabulary and propose 
similar policies, there will always be a risk of confusion. Only an in-depth discourse analysis 
can avoid it. 
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